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swinging from one view to the other. It would seem to this writer that
the weight of authority is in accord with the Schaefer case, i.e., that the
remedy is neither alternative nor exclusive, but that it rests in the sound
discretion of the court whether relief shall be given when there is another
less desirable remedy and so the relief asked for is within the spirit of
the act. This conclusion is arrived at by the fact that many jurisdictions
have swung from one side to the other without any apparent reason
except that in one case the remedy was more desirable than the coercive
remedy and in another case less desirable. The fact that courts have
taken a stand that the remedy is not alternative, and later given declara-
tory relief where another adequate remedy existed without any comment
on the point; the fact that courts have taken a definite stand that the
relief is alternative, and then when a close case came up justified their
refusal to give the declaratory relief on some technical grounds; the
very fact that the various writers have spent so much time trying'to
justify and distinguish these cases would tend to show that the courts
have taken the view set down in the Ohio case while trying to uphold
their former decisions.
The Ohio Supreme Court has laid a very flexible groundwork for
a very far reaching remedy. In the face of all the clamor for procedural
reform it is hoped that the bench and bar will use this remedy to cut
down time and expense. The legislature has refused to define, lest the
craft of man evade the definition. The bench should, in using this dis-
cretionary power, confine itself to the facts at hand and not lay down
unnecessary precedents which will be binding on later equally competent
courts. This decision and rule will further avoid the difficult problem
with which equity has to contend of deciding what "adequacy of the
other remedy" means and when it exists. ROBERT E. TEAFORD
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE - IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN WITNESS
Defendant was charged with the crime of burglary. On trial the
State introduced a witness who, before being convicted of the same
crime, had made a sworn statement confessing his part in the affair and
naming defendant as an associate. On the stand the witness failed to
identify defendant as one of his accomplices. Surprised by this change
of face the prosecutor was permitted to question the witness with regard
to his previous sworn statement. In reversing the Court of Appeals
which had reversed the Common Pleas Court, the Supreme Court held:
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(i) That the prosecutor was justifiably surprised; and (2) that being
thus surprised, it was proper for him to question the witness as to his
prior inconsistent statements in order to probe his conscience and to
refresh his recollection.'
The general rule that one may not impeach his own witness and
the extent to which it has been modified by exceptions remains a trouble-
some problem today.2 While the origin of this rule is not definitely
known, it is commonly asserted to have had its roots in the primitive
trial by compurgation.3 However, it has recently been suggested that a
more probable source is to be found in the gradual emergence of the
adversary method of trial from the old inquisitorial system.4 Whatever
its background, the rule seems to have had its beginnings in modern
jurisprudence at least as early as 168 1.' After its application in the trial
of Warren Hastings' in 1788, the rule became established beyond ques-
tion in both civil and criminal cases.' Starting with the case of State v.
Norris8 in 1796, the rule has been quite generally accepted in this coun-
try, yet the modifications and exceptions attached to it have been so
varied as to make it almost impossible to deal in terms of generalities
when discussing the views expressed in the cases.9
Broadly speaking the usual ways of impeaching a witness are by
showing bad character,1" which includes proof of conviction of crime and
reputation for truth and veracity; or by showing bias and interest; or
by showing that the witness had made prior contradictory statements;
or by showing the facts to be otherwise than as testified to by the wit-
ness. While the courts have been uniform in refusing to allow a party
'State v. Duffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, ix Ohio 0. 377, z5 N.E. (zd) 535 (1938).
"The numerous cases to be found in the digests attest the truth of this statement.WIGMORr, EVIENCE (2d Ed. 19Z3) sec. 896; Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 25, 20Z
Pac. 1099 (x927).
'Mason Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments (936)
4 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 69.
rIn Coolcdge's Trial of the same year the Lord Chief Justice said: "Whatsoever
witnesses you call, you call them as witnesses to testify to the truth for you; and if you ask
them any questions, you must take what they have said as truth. Therefore you must not
think to ask him any questions and afterwards call another witness to disprove your own
witness." 8 How. St. Tr. 636 (i6z8).
s Warrcn Hastings' Trial, Lords Journal, Feb. 9, April 1o, 31 Parl. Hist. 369
(1788).
7 WII ORE, supra, note 3.
a Haywood (N.C.) 429, 1 Am. Dec. 564 (1796).
"Werner, J., in People v. De Martini, 213 N.Y. 203, 21Z (1914). "Probably no
rule of evidence is more generally familiar than the rule that a party may not impeach his
own witness and yet there is none that has caused greater confusion in practice."
"' By "character" evidence the courts usually mean reputation, what others think of
him and not what he is or what the speaker believes. But most courts will permit the
question "Would you believe him on oath" to be asked if a proper foundation has been
laid and if it is based on his reputation for truth and veracity.
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to impeach his own witness by evidence of bad character," some diversity
of opinion exists with regard to bias and interest, with perhaps a greater
number of courts excluding such evidence.' 2 As to prior contradictory
statements the law appears to be in a state of confusion; so much so, in
fact, that unqualified statements regarding the various views expressed
are bound to be inadequate; yet some observations can be made. In one
way or another practically all courts have made some inroads on the
rule under this form, whether they recognize an exception or not. Thus
a substantial number of cases permit a party to interrogate his own wit-
ness as to previous inconsistent statements, not to discredit him, but
merely to refresh his recollection." Cases in this class impose, as a con-
dition precedent, the requirement of surprise or hostility as in the prin-
cipal case. Another line of cases, while adopting the doctrine of surprise,
are more candid than those just considered. These cases recognize an
exception and frankly admit that the purpose of showing such contra-
dictory statements is to discredit the witness.' 4 A few of the cases in this
group appear to confine the procedure to a questioning of the witness,"
whereas most of them go further and allow outside evidence, including
other witnesses, to prove the inconsistent statement.' 6 More liberal still
have been some of the statutes on this point, adopted in a number of
states.' Dispensing with the requirement of surprise, hostility, deception
and the like, these statutes permit proof of inconsistent statements by
outside evidence as in the case of an opponent's witness. Representative
" Carrington v. Davis, Wright, 735 (1834); State v. Carlyle, 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 335,
i Cleve. L. Rep. 338 (x878); People v. Minsky, ZZ7 N.Y. 94, 1z. N.E. xz6 (1919);
State v. Freeman, 213 N.C. 378, 196 S.E. 308 (1938)i Trout v. Commonwealth, 167 Va.
5xi, I88 S.E. 219 (936).
"2 Schmeltz v. Tracy, i19 Conn. 49z, 177 AtI. 52o (1935)5 People v. Washburn,
104. Cal. App. 66z, 286 Pac. 711 (1930); State v. Lustberg, ii N.J. Misc. 51, 164 Atl.
703 (1933); O'Rear v. Manchester Lumber Co., 6 Ala. App. 461, 6o So. 462 (1912).
"Harley v. State, 46 Ohio St. 3ZO, zi N.E. 645, 4 L.R.A. 16x (1889); People v.
Michails, 335 Ill. 590, 167 N.E. 857 (t9z9); Baker v. Roberts & Beir, zo9 Iowa 29o,
zz8 N.W. 9 (930); Stanley v. Sun Insurance Office, 1z6 Neb. zoS, 25z NV.W 807
"1 Williams v. State, 184 Ark. 622, 43 S.W. (zd) 731 (932); Carroll v. State,
5S Okl. Cr. 197, 28 Pac. (zd) 588 (x934); Sullivan v. U. S., z8 Fed. (2d) 147 (928);
State v. Lang, xo8 N.J. Law 98, 154 Atl. 864 (1931).
'rPeople v. Burnstein, 261 Mich. 534, 246 N.W. 217 (1933). State v. Saccoccio,
5o R.1. 356, 147 Atl. 878.
" Williams v. State, 184 Ark. 6zz, 43 S.W. (zd) 731 (193Z); Carroll v. State, 55
Okl. Cr. 197, 28 Pac. (2d) 588 (1934); Sullivan v. U. S., 28 Fed. (2d) 147 (19z8);
Hulett v. Hulett, xSz Miss. 476, 119 So. S8S (1929).
"Ark. Dig. 1921, sec. 4186; California Code Civ. Proc. 1931, sec. 2049; Idaho
Code 1932, c. x6, sec. 1207; Burns Ind. Stat. 1933, c. z, sec. 1726; Carroll's Ky. Code
1932, Civil Practice Code, sec. 596i Mont. Rev. Stat. 1921, sec. so666i New York, Civil
Proc. Act. 1937, sec. 343-a; Ore. Code 1930, c. 9, sec. 19o9; Texas Code Crim. Proc.
1928, sec. 732; Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1931, c. 89, sec. 17o6. In California the requirement of
surprise has been read into the statute, Whitelaw v. Whitelaw, 12Z Cal. App. 26o, 9 Pac.
(2d) 874 (193z)-
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of this class of statutes is the one adopted in Massachusetts which reads:
"The party who produces a witness shall not impeach his credit by evi-
dence of bad character, but may contradict him by other evidence, and
may also prove that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony . . ."" Other statutes have been less liberal,
incorporating the requirements of surprise or hostility and thereby limit-
ing their effectiveness.' 9 With regard to impeachment by proving the
facts to be different, it has been universally held, almost from the first,
that a party is not bound by the testimony of his witness; that is, he may
prove the facts to be other than as testified, even though the incidental
effect will be to impeach such witness."0
Another exception, separate, in a way, from those just considered,
exists where the witness is a necessary one as in the case of a will.2 '
There the witness is considered the witness of the law and not that of
the party calling him. Separate too is the exception where an adverse
party is called as a witness. Some states, including Ohio, have enacted
statutes on this problem." Elsewhere the rule is less settled."
Having considered in a general way the status of the law with
respect to impeaching one's own witness, an analysis of the reasons
behind the rule is appropriate. Curiously enough the recent cases in the
field, by and large, offer little help on this score. Following unques-
tioningly the precedent laid down in the earlier cases, they make little
or no attempt to justify the rule, but rather, consider it an elementary
premise in the law of evidence. Outstanding in his vigorous assault on
the rule, Professor Wigmore would eliminate it in its entirety; 24 others
concur."' Among the reasons advanced to justify the existence and con-
"' Mass. Gen. L. 193z, c. 233, sec. 233.
'"D. C. Code z929, tit. 9, sec. z; Fla. Comp. Gen. L. 1927, sec. 4377; Ga. Code
1933, sec. 5879; La. Code Crim. Proc. X93z, sec. 487, 488; N. Mex. Ann. Stats. 1929,
c. 45, sec. 607; Va. Code 1930, sec. 6zax; Vt. Pub. L. 1933, sec. 1702.
-" State Auto. Maut. Ins. Ass's. of Columbus, Ohio v. Friedman, 34 Ohio App. 551,
171 N.E. 419, af'd. zz Ohio St. 334, 171 N.E. 591 (1930); Kosienski v. State,
24 Ohio App. 22S, 57 N.E. 301 (1927); Baldassarre v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 24 Fed.
(2d) zo (192S); United Factories v. Brigham, 117 S.V. (2d) 66z (Mo. App., 1938).
"'Lott v. Lott, 174 Minn. 13, ziS N.W. 447 (19S); Thompson v. Owen, 174 Il.
z29, 51 N.E. 1046 (1898); State v. Slack, 69 Vt. 486, 38 Atl. 311 (1897); Atwood v.
Hayes, 139 Ol. 95, 281 Pac. 259 (Igz8).
-- Ohio G. C., sec. 11,497 reads: "At the instance of the adverse party, a party may
be examined as if under cross examination, either orally or by deposition, like any other
witness. If the party be a corporation any or all the officers thereof may be so examined
at the instance of the adverse party. The party calling for such examination shall thereby
be concluded but may rebut it by counter testimony."
"Sciffe v. Seiffe, 267 Ill. App. 23 (1932); Johnson v. Warrington, 2Z3 Iowa azx6,
240 N.W. 668 (193z).
' WmmonRE, supra, note 3, sec. 903.
2c Report of the Committee of the Commonwealth Fund, the Law of Evidence, Some
Proposals for Its Reform XVI, N. 1(927), "The rule prohibiting the impeachment of
one's own witness . . . has no shadow of good sense in any of its parts."
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tinued use of the rule are: (I) a party vouches for his witness or guar-
antees his credibility;2 (2) a party should not be able to control his
witness's testimony; 2 (3) without such a rule the jury might use prior
contradictory statements substantively as proof rather than to determine
the witness's credibility."
A common expression of the rule founded upon the reason that a
party vouches for the credibility of his own witness is found in GREEN-
LEAF ON EVIDENCE:29 "When a party offers a witness in proof of his
cause, he thereby, in general, represents him as worthy of belief. He is
presumed to know the character of the witnesses he adduces; and having
thus presented them to the court, the law will not permit the party after-
wards to impeach their general reputation for truth, or to impugn their
credibility by general evidence tending to show them unworthy of belief."
The reason thus expressed has been vigorously assailed and not without
cause.3" The fallacy of this reason seems to lie in the assumption that a
party knows the character of his witness when, as a matter of fact, he
has no such knowledge for the obvious reason that he must choose his
witnesses on the basis of the facts to which they can testify rather than
on the basis of their character."' Moreover, this reason is not consistent
with the rule, already noticed, that a party is not absolutely bound by
the statements of his witness."2
A more sound reason in support of the rule is that a party should
not be able to control his witnesses' testimony. This theory which was
first asserted by Justice Buller in i767,"3 was frequently reiterated in
the earlier decisions. Wigmore makes more clear its foundation in the
following statement: "If it were permissible, and therefore common, to
impeach the character of one's witness whose testimony had been disap-
pointing, no witness would care to risk the abuse of his character which
might then be launched at him by the disappointed party. The fear of
the possible consequences would operate subjectively to prevent a repent-
ant witness from recanting a previously falsified story, and would more
or less affect every witness who knew that the party calling him expected
him to tell a particular story. Of this sort of abuse from the opposite
20 Biaggini v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 163 So. 780 (La. App., '935); Stiffy v.
Schultz, 2x5 Iowa 837, 246 N.W. go (933); State v. Keefe, 54 Kan. 197, 38 Pac. 302
(2894); Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. z4, 45 Am. Rep. 583 (188z).
7- Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24, 45 Am. Rep. 583 (188z).
28 Young v. U. S., 97 Fed. (zd) 200 (1938); Kuhn v. U. S., 24 Fed. (zd) gxo
(igz8); Alabama Power Co. v. Hall, 212 Ala. 638, 103 So. 867 (1925); WIGMTORE, note
3, supra, sec. 903.
29 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (1 866), sec. 44z.
30 8z A.S.R. 57 (x9oz).
" May, Some Rules of Evidence (1876), 11 Am. L. Rev. z6x.
32 Note 17, supra.
33 Nisi Prus, 297 (1767).
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side the witness is even now sufficiently afraid; were he liable to it from
either side indiscriminately, the terrors of the witness box would be
doubled. Speculative as this danger may be it furnished the only shred
of reason on which the rule may be supported." 34 This theory has been
discredited largely on the ground that as a practical matter the undesir-
able results prophesied in the absence of the rule are not only unnecessary,
but improbable. Briefly, the arguments with respect to impeachment by
bad character are that no coercion would take place if the attorney were
honest and the witness informed him beforehand of his position; that
were such not the case, the witness, being subject to exposure from the
opposite party, would scarcely be influenced particularly by fear of ex-
posure at the hands of the party calling him; that, in any event, fear of
a perjury charge would be sufficient to overcome any possible fear of
impeachment.35 With respect to impeachment by bias and interest the
argument is about the same as is offered with respect to impeachment
by prior contradictory statements; mainly, that no coercion is possible
when no fear exists. Wigmore summarizes the situation in the following
words: "There is no necessary implication of bad character, no smirching
of reputation, no exposure of misdeeds on cross examination, nothing that
could fairly operate to coerce either an honest or a dishonest witness to
persist in an incorrect story through fear of the party calling him. An
honest witness could readily explain how he came to make the former
statement; a dishonest one would not be deterred from returning to
truth by such a trifling obstacle."3 6
The final reason urged in support of the rule is that without it the
jury might consider the prior statements offered as substantive proof. It
is indeed questionable whether this reason is sound in view of the many
instances in which the same danger is present and where no particular
difficulty is felt. Thus if a party be allowed to cross examine a witness
with regard to contradictions for the purpose of refreshing his memory,
the former statement is before the jury; similarly the cross examina-
tion of an adversary's witness presents the same situation. Therefore it
would seem that the danger could be guarded against by proper instruc-
tions to the jury as prescribed in these other cases."
As has been pointed out, eminent authorities on the law of evidence
favor a complete abolition of the rule that one may not impeach his own
witness, not only because it is felt that no substantial reason can be given
in support of it, but also because the ascertainment of truth and the
3, WI ORE, note 3, supra, see. 899.
3r See note 4, sura.
0 WIGmORE, note 3, supra, sec. 9o2.
"' The Judicial Council, Second Report (New York x936).
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promotion of justice would be greatly aided thereby. Actually a statute
designed to approximate this result was proposed in New York in 1935," s
but was not accepted. Later a modified form of the proposal was
enacted which allows for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements
provided they be in writing and sworn to.39 Commenting on the pro-
posal, Professor Ladd suggested that it would be simpler to solve the
entire problem by enacting a statute reading: "No party shall be pre-
cluded from impeaching a witness because the witness is his own."4
In view of the statutes which have been enacted and the exceptions
recognized in some States, there can be little doubt that the trend in the
development of the law today is towards a modification of the rule,
particularly with respect to prior inconsistent statements. It may be that
the courts can find some justification for retaining the rule with respect
to the other modes of impeachment, but it would be helpful if they
would review its foundations in the light of present day circumstances.
WILLIAM L. ANDERSON
EVIDENCE - PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUICIDE - NATURE AND
EFFECT ON BURDEN OF PROOF
Under the early common law suicide was a felony of serious import
considered more atrocious than murder. Hartman, The Presumption
Against Suicide As Applied in Insurance Cases (1935) i9 Marq. L.
Rev. 20; State v. LaFayette, 15 N. J. Misc. 115, 188 At. 918
(937). Blackstone describes how the suicide was given an ignominious
burial along the highway, with a stake driven through his body; more-
over, all his goods and chattels were forfeited to the crown. 4 Bl.
Comm. Although the exact date when the presumption against suicide
arose is not known, it was during this early period that the judges
created this device to ease the harshness of the penalty placed upon the
innocent family of the deceased. At the present time suicide is not
treated with such severity and the original basis for the presumption
is gone. However, the presumption still continues to be a rule of law in
most of our states. Mitchell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 135
Ohio St. Iio, 19 N.E. (2d) 769 (1939); Wilder'sAdmr. v. Southern
Mining Co., 265 Ky. 219, 96 S.W. (2d) 436 (1936); Dow v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 7 N.E. (2d) 426 (Mass., 1937);
Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 4merica, 132 Neb. 831, 273
ss Recommended changes in Practice Procedure & Evidence, Commission on the Ad-
ministration of Justice in New York State, p. 61, sec. 38.
:9 New York Civil Proc. Act. 1937, sec. 343-a.40 See note 4, supra.
